http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/site/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/66686/index.do 
Rochefort v. The Queen[1] (January 31, 2014) involved a claim for a GST/HST new housing rebate:
[1] In March 2010, Mr. Rochefort and his wife signed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale to acquire a home to be constructed as their primary residence. Due to their failure to qualify for a mortgage, Mr. Rochefort asked his nephew, Mr. Fontaine, to become a co-signor, which entailed Mr. Fontaine becoming a joint tenant on title with Mr. Rochefort. Mr. Rochefort applied for the GST/HST New Housing Rebate, and a rebate of $27,277.29 was credited to the developer, DCR Phoenix Development Corporation Limited (“DCR”). The Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) assessed Mr. Rochefort denying the rebate on the basis the requirement in subparagraph 254(2)(e) of the
Excise Tax Act (the “Act“) had not been met.
The evidence was clear that the nephew had no ownership interest in the home and was simply doing a favour for his uncle (who had credit problems):
[5] Mr. Fontaine testified that he never paid any part of the mortgage, or any of the property bills. He and Mr. Rochefort were clear that if the property ever sold Mr. Fontaine was entitled to nothing, “not a dime”, as Mr. Rochefort put it. This was clearly not an investment for Mr. Fontaine but a family favour to help the Rocheforts acquire their new home. As Mrs. Rochefort indicated, Mr. Fontaine simply came in to help them out at the last minute.
The court took a purposive and highly practical approach to the legislation:
[21] From a policy perspective, the Rocheforts are clearly who the rebate is meant to benefit, as they are the buyers of the property, the ones liable for the GST, and they took possession of the property after substantial completion to reside in it as their primary residence.
[22] The matter really boils down to whether Mrs. Rochefort acquired sufficient rights to constitute ownership and therefore Mr. Rochefort met the conditions set forth in subparagraph 254(2)(e) of the Act. Mrs. Rochefort signed an agreement to become the owner, she provided deposit monies to become the owner, she acted as owner in making decisions amending the Purchase and Sale Agreement, she was liable for the GST, she took possession of the property with her husband and in every way she behaved as an owner by using and enjoying the property. As for whether she held any right to convey the property, there are a couple of possible avenues where she may have obtained such a right. First, as a beneficial owner of the property, and, second, as a spouse living in the matrimonial home.
[23] What evidence is there of a beneficial ownership by Mrs. Rochefort in the property? Did Mr. Fontaine hold legal ownership in the property in trust for Mrs. Rochefort? To say the arrangement between the Rocheforts and Mr. Fontaine was loose is mildly understating the situation. What is the evidence?
a) Mr. Fontaine had no intention of having to pay anything with respect to the property either by way of purchase price or ongoing expenses;
b) Mr. Fontaine and the Rocheforts believed Mr. Fontaine had no right to any gain from the property;
c) Mr. Fontaine did not appreciate he was going on title as an owner; he was simply doing the Rocheforts a favour;
d) the Rocheforts and Mr. Fontaine considered that the property was the Rocheforts; and
e) Mr. Rochefort believed he could at any time require Mr. Fontaine to transfer title to the Rocheforts.
[24] I conclude that in these circumstances, Mr. Fontaine agreed to hold title solely for the benefit of the Rocheforts, and, as a trustee of the property, was required to convey title to the Rocheforts on demand, or to any third party at their request. That, I find, was the deal and satisfies me Mrs. Rochefort was a beneficial owner.
Accordingly the appeal was allowed:
[26] Taking an expansive view of ownership, not limited to legal title, bundling Mrs. Rochefort’s rights together as sufficient to constitute ownership, considering the purpose of subsection 254(2) of the Act would be met if the rebate was granted, and distinguishing this case from those where the supportive third party funder is considered a “particular individual”, I conclude that Mr. Rochefort is entitled to the new housing rebate in accordance with the requirements in subsection 254(2) of the Act. The Appeal is allowed and referred back to the Minister for reassessment in accordance with these Reasons.
[1] 2014 TCC 34.